With respect to the types of arrangements such as strategic engagement mentioned by Pumphrey, the United States should continue to monitor China’s engagement and actions in the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, and in ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The United States should leverage the power of the group and the influence of the organizations and the advantages they offer to China as a member in order to put subtle pressure on China to support U.S. interests. In addition to the foreign policy approach of strategic engatgement, The United States must keep in mind that China wants desperately to be part of these groups, for strategic, diplomatic, and pragmatic reasons, and that sanctions imposed by any of these three organizations would be a blemish on the face of the Chinese government. Thus, key agendas the U.S. wishes to advance with China should, to the greatest extent possible, be presented and persuaded in the halls of these organizations.

The other important and often overlooked aspect of the multi-pronged foreign policy approach of strategic engagement being recommended here is that of nurturing critical relationships with our country’s historical allies, especially Australia and Britain, as well as Canada and other large, developed nations with robust economies and militaries, as well as stable political infrastructures. Our dependence upon these allies has become more crucial than ever, particularly considering that the United States’ reputation was tarnished by President George W. Bush’s foreign policy blunders. One of the obvious reasons why securing a renewed commitment from our traditional allies is so important is because we cannot be naïve to the fact that the Chinese government has made building the size and capacity of its military a priority in domestic policy. Because the United States maintains numerous interests in the Middle East and Southeast Asian regions, and because our own military power is not particularly robust due to troop commitments in other areas of the world, the United States would require the aid and support, both on the field and off, should the Chinese and the United States square off in war. While it is hoped that a strategic engagement policy will function to avoid a war, contingency plans must be made for any scenario, including direct conflict.

Another compelling reason for improving ties with traditional allies is that doing so will clarify those countries’ own policy perspectives with respect to China. Close relationships with allies will help the United States identify both common and divergent interests, and the United States can then know what is important to allied countries and what resources may need to be offered in order to persuade support. Once the basis for a mutually beneficial relationship has been established, the contact with allies should not only be limited to contingency planning for times of war, though it should address such a possibility. Relationships with allies should also be developed in order to exert influence within the institutions and organizations to which China belongs, as was mentioned earlier. Furthermore, these allied countries can exert their own influence over China and its allies in order to extract favorable agreements and arrangements for a wide number of issues, including trade, human rights matters, weapons stockpiling and trading, women’s rights, fair labor practices, and other regional interests. Deploying their own policies and practices of strategic engagement, these allied countries can play a critical role for U.S.-Chinese relations, potentially serving as brokers and mediators between the two great powers.

The United States has sat around and waited long enough. It is time to develop and then implement a new foreign policy regarding China that includes ideas of strategic engagement and foreign policy enforcement.. The sleeping dragon has awoken, and its size and strength alone are cause for concern, even if it exhibits no intentions to topple the United States as the world’s heretofore uncontested superpower. Although the approach of this new foreign policy should be proactive, it should also be positive. While not denying or avoiding planning for the possibility of hegemonic disruption, whether through war or other events that would be considered adverse to U.S. interests, a policy of strategic engagement functions, above all, to create the conditions and relationships that do everything to avoid such negative possibilities. A policy of strategic engagement, achieved through improving diplomatic ties, leveraging the power of international organizations of which China is a member, and collaborating for mutual benefit with allies, is far more likely to benefit the U.S. interests than an aggressive policy that not only increases hostility, but also cuts off any opportunity to learn more about Chinese motives and plans.

Works Cited

Cha, Victor D. “Winning Asia.” Foreign Affairs 86.6 (2007): 98-113.

Chen, Shuxun, and Charles Wolf. China, the United States, and the Global Economy. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001.

Feng, Hui. The Politics of China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization: The Dragon Goes Global. London: Routledge, 2006.

Liu, Guoli. Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition. New York: Aldine de Gryter, 2004.

Pumphrey, Carolyn. The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.

Shuja, Sharif. “Pragmatism in Chinese Foreign Policy.” Contemporary Review 289.1684 (2007): 62.