At one point, Burgess (2000) quoted the insight of one historian with respect to the 1972 Paris Summit: “‘a new objective had been set—but what it meant and how it was to be achieved were problems deliberately set aside for later consideration’” (p. 101). Nonetheless, despite this obvious ambiguity with respect to the direction of unification efforts, the anxieties related to the post-war period and the alleged threats of Communism had dwindled, new concerns had emerged, and the combination of these factors seemed to converge in such a way that new possibilities for fresh conversations and innovative unification strategies could be pursued. The original intents behind the initial move toward European unity were thus subverted as new developments on the world stage took place and the motivations and sound reasons for European unity become clearer.
It is important to point out that there was a loose federation of European countries in the European Community (EC), which in many ways was the forerunner of what is known today as the European Union (Burgess, 2000). Despite expansionist efforts of the European Community, however, many European nations—especially non-super powers—found themselves outside the EC’s membership. While the EC had many of the same ambitions as those that would ultimately interest the European Union—such as economic policy and political and military alliance-building—the European Community’s formal powers were limited (Burgess, 2000). By 1974, many heads of state had come to the theoretical—if not yet operational–agreement that in order to achieve unification in a meaningful sense of the word, they would need to institute some formalized structures and policies (Burgess, 2000).
One way to start, they concluded, was to meet three times per year, to establish inter-country councils and task forces to examine specific aspects of unification (such as a single passport, currency issues, and trade matters, to name just a few), and to begin to “gradually adopt common positions and coordinate their diplomatic action in all areas of international affairs that affected the European Community” (Burgess, 2000, p. 104). While these steps were still somewhat vague compared to the specific actions that would need to occur in order to constitute the European Union, they did represent a substantial advancement compared to previous efforts, and the very verbalization that the countries would begin to look at issues from a continental perspective rather than a national one was a significant paradigm shift.
By late 1975 to early 1976, the verbalized commitment of the heads of state had begun to take tangible shape in the form of a document known as the Tindeman Report (Burgess, 2000). In the Tindeman Report, the framework for European unification was finally laid out in a manner that was clear, concise, and, seemingly, achievable. The Tindeman Report expressed the need for interested member countries to work together in order to establish the “political organs required to enable the Union over a period which will, of necessity, be rather long, gradually to assume effective responsibility in its various fields of competence,” ultimately resulting in “the development of a European governmental executive… an executive body with political authority….” (Burgess, 2000, p. 109). The Tindeman Report was one of the most crucial periods in the path to European unification.
