While both books contend that the evangelic population was a valuable part of his support base, it should be considered in the context of how he violated this group that exists with the working class core that the Republicans have lost for good—at least for now.

The authors of the Grand New Party offer several thought-provoking points of analysis that transcend value associations based on whether or not one agrees with their assertions as they are balanced in their approach. While aligned with the politically conservative (as opposed to socially as such bias is a bit more difficult to detect) view, they offer a critique of the Bush administration that is succinct and almost prosaic in its clarity and use of examples. They describe the lead up to the most traumatic events that led to the working class and other American dissociation with the Republican party by suggesting that Bush-era policies in general were defined by “two overlapping flaws—a team with a better grasp of politics than policy and a White House that prized loyalty over brilliance [which] bore fruit in the bills the administration signed into law” (Douthat and Salam 105). They provide a few revelatory examples of how there were ample opportunities for the Bush administration to provide much-needed assistance and goal-oriented initiatives aimed at delivering on promises to working class voters, but instead when with loyalties—particularly to outside interest groups and lobbyists. One of the most important of these, especially as it still burns strong in the collective American consciousness, despite the current temporary halt in cripplingly high gas prices, is their handling of the increase in gasoline prices when they first began to hit working Americans hard. The authors note that the administration could have “used an energy initiative that either addresses Sam’s Club voters’ concerns over rising prices at the pump or accepted short-term pain in an effort to break what Bush (accurately enough) termed America’s addiction to oil. Instead it got an expensive package of handouts to oil and natural gas interests, more or less written by energy lobbyists that did neither” (Douthat and Salam 105). The author cite various other chances the Bush administration had to ally themselves distinctly in the corner of their core Sam’s club voter base, but repeatedly, they took the low road with their cronyism and constructions of literal and metaphorical “bridges to nowhere.”

The authors of Right On in their more casual, less critical (at least overly critical) assessments of Bush-era policy in his first term suggest that Bush did act unilaterally in several ways, even within his own party which had begun to cause some significant shifts in inter-party relations. Before his second election into presidential office, there were already a number of grumbling conservatives who were growing worried about the crisis of confidence Bush’s poor decisions were having on the party. According to the authors of Grand New Party: How Republicans Can Win the Working Class and Save the American Dream, “some complained about the Iraq War, some about the Bush administration’s expansive view of executive power, some about the GOP’s social conservatism…but nearly all of them agreed that the domestic policy failings of the Bush years were primarily a matter of too much spending” (Douthat and Salam 91). One can imagine how the sentiments of his own party members might have reflected the overall feelings of the American public who elected him once more, although certainly not by any kind of landslide victory. In fact, Douthat and Salam contribute his second victory to mere luck (93) and question the reasons why, even with an incredibly unpopular war, he still retained enough loyalty to continue. The answer seems, at least based on an assessment of both books in tandem that are discussed here is that for this particular president, loyalty on its own was enough to help Bush weather the difficult storms of record-low approval ratings. Again, this matter of “loyalty over brilliance” emerges and serves as an overriding thesis that both texts make about the president, although Right On could never have had any idea of the further violations of party and public trust that were forthcoming in his second term. In fact, one might be correct in assuming that the authors of Right On, if permitted to recompile the book using their statements from his first term with their observations of his second, might revise their more casual form of critique. In other words, there was far more to criticize in terms of international, economic, and social policy in the second W. presidency than the first—especially if such a new edition were to place these elements into the context of what appears to be a new depression.

Bush-era policies that ignored the values and needs of this vital voter base are almost too numerous to count and include mistakes and missteps in almost every arena; from social policy, international relations (especially in the context of globalization and working class concerns about the shifts associated with it) and general economic and fiscal decisions. If one were, even in an objective, non-partisan, unbiased way, to look at the succession of Bush administration policies that overtly ignored the needs of working class voters, the list would be longer than one could imagine possible for a mere eight years. Any element on such a list would signify but one of many striking, flagrant mishandlings and violations of voter trust that contributed significantly to the national post-Bush PTSD that defined the tone of the presidential elections that chose, albeit more cautiously than one might imagine, a Democratic leader who was not only fresh in the political areana—but an African American to boot. One has to wonder if this historically unprecedented event even would have taken place if the dramatic misappropriation of working class voter’s values and issues of important had not occurred during Bush’s marathon run in office.

The Bush administration, whether one takes a more fair view to analyze policy as the authors of Right On do, or a more critique-based approach such as that offered by the authors of the Grand New Party, cannot be viewed in black or white terms. There were serious wrongs committed by Bush administration that are difficult to deny no matter which end of the political spectrum one falls under, and most of these can be seen as having a direct impact on the working class voters who were the strongest initial supporters of President Bush and who helped him get elected not once, but twice, despite mounting evidence during his first time that his alliances were questionable.

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Works Cited

Douthat, Ross, and Reihan Salam. Grand New Party: How Republicans Can Win the Working Class and Save the American Dream. New York: DoubleDay, 2006.

Iwan, Morgan, and Philip Davies. Right On?: Political Change And Continuity in George W. Bush’s America. Sussex UK: Brookings Institution Press, 2005.