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A dramatic shift occurred in Buddhism in Mongolia in the early 20th century which would have a significant impact on the practice and expression of Mongolian Buddhism. During the 1919 invasion by the Chinese, Mongolia turned towards its northern neighbor, Russia, to assist with the resistance movement (University of Pennsylvania 9). At home, Russia had just established a fledgling communist system, and it was eager to support Mongolia, in the hope that their aid would, in turn, expand communism beyond Russia’s borders, thereby strengthening the communist experiment (University of Pennsylvania 9). The cooperative relationship between the two countries was mutually beneficial, as the Mongolian-Russian alliance defeated China in 1921 and Mongolia once again declared its independence (University of Pennsylvania 9). This alliance, however, would have serious implications for Mongolian Buddhism.
As part of their agreement to return Russia’s favor, Mongolia established a socialist system that endured for 40 years and which all but eradicated Buddhism from daily life, forcing Buddhist adherents underground (University of Pennsylvania 9). During this time, shamanistic religions enjoyed a period of revivalism, as “the nomadic needs” of the common Mongolian “could not be satisfied by the purely otherworldly religion of the Buddha” (Atwood 113), which was increasingly obscure because of Russian sanctions against the practice of denominational religions. It was not until 1989, when communism in Russia began to fail, that Mongolian Buddhism would re-emerge publicly, though it never fully disappeared (University of Pennsylvania 9).
Modern History: Buddhism in Mongolia The Role of Japan: 1932-1945
Despite the obvious and strong influence that the Russian communists exerted over Mongolia and its Buddhist practices, there were other Asian neighbors that asserted their influence and opinions as well (Narangoa 491). Japan evidenced a particular interest in Mongolia because of the vastness of its territory, an area that would be “geopolitically important in the event of a conflict between either China or the Soviet Union” (Narangoa 492). If Japan forged a positive relationship with Mongolia, it supposed, then it could occupy strategic territories for military purposes. In addition, the Japanese considered the Mongolian region to be “politically important as well [because] the Japanese believed that if they won the support of Mongols there, they would also win support and sympathy from Mongols living in the regions dominated by the Soviet Union and China” (Narangoa 492). Japan was an astute observer, and recognizing that Buddhism was so important to the Mongolian population, it decided to posit its strategy of building support by working directly with Buddhists, using the same kind of reasoning used by Chinggis Khan.
Between the period of 1932-1945, Japan exerted a special degree of influence over the practice and expression of Buddhism in Mongolia. Because it was seeking support from Eastern allies in its war effort, Japan was offered support in-kind to potential allies in the development of certain infrastructural elements of their societies (Narangoa 491). According to Narangoa, Japan instituted a series of complex “policies to support and reform Mongolian Buddhism” (491). In addition to attempting to influence actual practices, the Japanese built monasteries that were intended to serve as conduits of education for the Mongolian population (Narangoa 491). The Japanese rationale for establishing Mongolian monasteries was based on their intention to propagate and generate support for the modernization of the entire Asian region, which Japan wished to spearhead and direct, for obvious political and economic reasons (Narangoa 496).
As Narangoa points out, the “Mongol leaders and Buddhists generally cooperated in such arrangements because of the protection and status they conferred” (491). As one sees, once again Mongolian Buddhism became an instrument of political agency and influence. Buddhist monks were even used as chaplains during military operations, demonstrating the degree to which the Japanese were able to co-opt Buddhism to further its own interests, as well as the interests of Mongolian leaders (Narangoa 496). Finally, because the majority of the Japanese population was Buddhist, the Japanese leaders and strategists assumed that the Mongolians Buddhists would be persuaded by their efforts, adopting the view that the Japanese and Mongolian Buddhists were linked in a kind of religious fraternity (Narangoa 496), this despite the fact that the Mongolian expression and practice of Buddhism was distinctly different from that of the Japanese, for the reasons of spiritist influence and the historiographical issues already discussed.
Late 20th Century Developments
Kaplonski indicates that the collapse of socialism in Mongolia in 1990 precipitated the full and public return of Buddhism as “a key symbol in constructing conceptions of Mongolness” (23). In a sense, at the end of the 20th century, thousands of years after the rule of Chinggis Khan, Buddhism continued to play the same role that it always has in Mongolian history. Kaplonski explains that in the 1990s “the early democratic opposition quickly seized on the symbolic importance of Buddhism in constructing a particular concept of being Mongol” (23). At the same time however, the collapse of socialism opened the door to new religious groups that had previously not been known in Mongolia, especially particular Protestant groups, such as Charismatics (Fagan 36), and their presence is changing the religious landscape of this country. As a recent article in Christianity Today proclaimed, “Mongolia now is ripe for evangelism” (90), and Western Christian missionaries are flocking to Mongolia in droves, hurrying to establish churches before China possibly restricts their access, as Mongolia has become economically dependent on China and is largely responsive to Chinese demands (Christianity Today 90).
