Tilley (2005) argues that the one-state solution is the only feasible strategy that exists for achieving “real democracy, through a bridging of peoples and their histories” between Palestine and Israel (p. ). Rejecting the two-state solution as an “obsolete” and unrealistic model because Palestine and Israel are, if nothing else, economically and geographically interdependent, Tilley is correct in her assertion that the one-state solution is both preferable to and more plausible than two independent nation states that isolate themselves politically. Yet Tilley does not go far enough in developing a blueprint for the operationalization of a one-state plan. While the “bridging of people and their histories” is a noble idea, it is overly idealistic and dangerously naïve for it fails to consider the historical differences between the two groups and the rationale each side has for defending its respective historical identity.
A one-state solution that offers shared power between Israelis and Palestinians while allowing both groups to retain their unique ethnic and national identities contained within the geographical boundaries of two states is a more viable plan than the one proposed by Tilley. Sharing power in a region where neither group is privileged politically by preventing the usurpation of more territory is more likely to lead to a successful and lasting peace, as well as a political framework that is more advantageous to both states. Tilley dismisses the two-state option, considering geographic and political statehood to be mutually exclusive. “The two-state option,” Tilley writes, “has been eliminated as a practical solution [because] Jewish settlements have carved Palestinian territory into a vestige too small to sustain a viable national society” (p. 2). In addition, she notes, the two-state solution is unviable because the creation of Palestine as a state would only perpetuate the instability that currently characterizes the region; Palestine, she predicts, would be “cut off” from Israel’s physical and economic resources (p. 3). The inevitable result would be a “sealed vessel of growing poverty and demoralization,” a condition that would benefit neither group of stakeholders (p. 5).
The one-state solution is the only alternative to this dismal scenario, but it is not a simple one to implement. Each group needs to feel as if it is permitted to retain geographic and cultural identity while pledging to collaborate fully on mutually relevant concerns. The most effective way to achieve this delicate balance is by instituting a one-state solution that has a single seat of government while allowing each state to retain its geographical identity and exert geographical sovereignty. With respect to some of the operational minutiae of a one-state solution in the larger context of the Middle East, an obvious question is where the capital of the collaborative government will be located. The solution proposed by this writer is Jerusalem.
Although the idea that the new capital should be located in either one of the two countries (as opposed, say, to a rotating seat of government or a shared physical seat of power) is likely to be controversial, particularly for Palestinians (Talhami, 2003), Tilley’s analysis of this issue in the Middle East does provide insight as to why this plan is logical. As Tilley notes, Israel has so expanded its own territory through incursions into Palestine and other international stakeholders have become so invested in the current geographical boundaries drawn in the region that it is not realistic to think that former Palestinian territories can be reclaimed or that the current borders will be redrawn. Furthermore, the task of redrawing boundaries and moving current settlements would doom the unified state before it even had a chance to thrive. Quite simply, the redistribution would require all of the government’s resources, leaving no funding or services for day-to-day operations.
Jerusalem is the logical seat of government because it offers more services and has a more developed physical infrastructure compared to any city in Palestine. While it is simple to argue that the government could and should work towards rebuilding and expanding the infrastructure in Palestine and thus across the Middle East, it is unlikely that a transformation requiring considerable investment of time, manpower, and financial resources could occur immediately. Instead, the new government should work from a seat of strength using existing capacities to improve any areas that have limited resources according to a negotiated strategic framework, to which are tied measurable outcomes and timetables. Israelis must understand that while the seat of government is located within their geographical territory, the Palestinians have equal access and representation to it; thus contesting the long-standing Israeli policy and practice of “disappearing the… Arabs” (Finkelstein, 2001, p. 2). While territory taken cannot, logistically, be replaced, Palestinians must be assured that they will not continue to be displaced; otherwise, a one-state solution will not be effective (Finkelstein). For this reason, the most ideal version of a one-state plan is for external advisors to provide oversight. The United Nations could perform such a function in this area of the Middle East, offering technical and political support conditioned upon sustained peace and demonstrated commitment of both Palestinian and Israeli stakeholders.
Finally, non-governmental organizations could also play a meaningful role in assisting with the work of establishing a fledgling one-state democracy in which Palestine and Israel are equal partners who retain their own geographical territories. By providing resources and support for rebuilding the devastated communities of Palestine and addressing the very real problem of Palestinian refugees, including the provision of repatriation for the refugees who have sought shelter and safety in third countries in the Middle East (Talhami, 2003), NGOs would offer expertise and neutrality to two parties whose conflicts have been so pervasive and persistent that any efforts—however well-intentioned—to achieve a viable and lasting one-state solution will be likely to pose considerable ideological, cultural, and political challenges.
References
Finkelstein, N.G. (2001). Image and reality of the Israel-Palestine conflict. New York: Verso.
Talhami, G.H. (2003). Palestinian refugees: Pawns to political actors. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers.
Tilley, V. (2005). The one-state solution: A breakthrough for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
