George Frost Kennan, now recognized in history as the “father of containment” served in several capacities in the United States government, but was most influential in his role as the Ambassador to the Soviet Union in Moscow in the 1940s. With a formal education from Princeton and the ability to speak several languages, Kennan was particularly well-suited to foreign diplomacy positions. Before serving in Moscow, Kennan spent time conducting international affairs in Berlin, Estonia, Latvia, and other eastern European nations. He watched Stalin’s actions, including the Great Purge with enormous interest and his study and understanding of this event would go on to have a significant impact of his perceptions of the Soviet Union.
After fulfilling diplomatic functions for the Allied forces in Berlin during and shortly after World War II, Kennan was appointed deputy head of the United States envoy in Moscow. He served in this capacity from 1944 until 1946 and just before leaving, he wrote the infamous “Long Telegram,” which would later appear in a more expanded version in a 1947 issue of Public Affairs which Kennan signed anonymously as “X” even though it was immediately clear to many who the author was. The Long Telegram and to a lesser degree, the article, would have significant impacts worldwide and would eventually spark the long events of the Cold War and its associated policies.
During the Second World War and shortly thereafter, relations between the United States and Soviet Union were relatively stable. It was not until talks between the two nations became strained as a result of the Soviet Unions increased demands for land and reparations that tensions began to mount. Even before Kennan’s telegram was sent these issues were coming to the forefront of international concern. Once the telegram garnered attention from Washington, theUnited States was becoming convinced that the Soviet Union had more expansionist ideas in mind in their quest for Poland and other territories and they began to fear that the Soviets were making a direct attempt to spread Communism worldwide. The Long Telegram was sent just after Stalin made a speech about the potential for conflict between the capitalists and their encroachment on the Soviet Union.
When it was sent, Kennan “had become increasingly vexed by his failure to make Washington understand what he believed to be the Soviet Union’s international intentions” (Lukacs 1995). Although it will be discussed later how this effort to inform Washington of the potential Soviet threat was acted out by Truman and successive United States leaders, its short-term impact was of setting forth a clear definition of the route the Soviets were taking. The telegram puts forth several important ideas about the intentions of the Soviet government and Kennan discusses at length the “Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs” (1946). Kennan suggests that eventually the Soviet powerhouse would collapse, especially if Western institutions and power networks were strengthened. In Kennan’s mind this was because the Soviet power structure was built on weak and unsustainable principles and it ruled based on fear and isolationism. At one point in the telegram, Kennan writes that it is the Soviet’s “instinctive fear of the outside world” (1946) that has allowed a dictatorship to thrive.
Of the Long Telegram, Kennan states that this fear “is the fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability” (1946). According to Kennan’s view as set forth in the telegram, Communism and capitalism would always be at odds and that under the banner of Communism, the Soviets would attempt to align a number of other countries against Western powers. In addition to his observations about the philosophical basis of the Soviet government, Kennan also notes that, “World communism is like [a] malignant parasite which feeds on diseased tissue” (1946). After spending time in Moscow and seeing the possibilities of democracy and happiness for the people, Kennan is suggesting that the parasite still exists because the government, by proxy of their campaign of fear and secrecy, is keeping the tissue (the fabric of Soviet society and its people) weak and diseased. This was an insidious image of Communism and the Soviet government, one of many of which Kennan puts forth. Such words would go a long way in determining both the short and long-term impacts of the telegram.
The short-term impact of the Long Telegram was to engage United States leaders with the issues they were facing with the Soviet Union. Some similar sentiment about the intentions of the Soviet Union already existed, especially in Truman’s mind and as a result, Kennan’s Long Telegram further solidifiedTruman’s hatred of Communism and his resolution to not allow it to spread. In many ways, however, although he is called the “father of containment” the word “containment” is not featured in the telegram but was something that came about after it was received back in Washington. Furthermore, in terms of the long-term impact of the telegram, the Cold War ensued, although not in the way Kennan had intended. He was not, in fact, calling for outright military action against the Soviets, instead he was hoping for an economic alliance that would eventually bring them down naturally. When he stated in the telegram that the Soviets were the weaker force and that “their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western world can muster” (1946) he did not seem to be making a call for military strength, but only one for economic and social fortitude. When NSC-68, which was formulated in 1950 came about, it was much more forceful and aggressive in terms of defining the enemy and what to do about them. In some ways then, the Long Telegram was the instigator of more intense reactions rather than a true militaristic call to arms. However, when Kennan set forth such statements as how the Soviet Union was “impervious to the logic of reason but highly sensitive to the logic of force” (Kennan 1946) he was not necessarily speaking of force in terms of military action, but force in terms of their pervasive fear of outside aggression and intrusions upon their secrecy.
In conclusion, there were three main aspects of the Long Telegram, “the principal motivating factors behind Soviet policy, the historical and ideological background of the post-war Soviet perception of international relations and…the far-reaching repercussions for U.S. foreign policy” (Fakiolas 1997). Although Kennan does put forth many ideas that would later influence the United States engagement in the Cold War, this seems to have been a rather unforeseen long-term impact. What Kennan was suggesting in the telegram, above all else, is that with the right amount of strengthening in the United States and their political and economic influences, Communism and Soviet encroachment could be halted. This is because the system was not incredibly strong to begin with since its foundations were based on principles of fear and isolationism. When Kennan made comments such as, “All Soviet propaganda beyond [the] Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy it by any intelligent and really constructive program” (1946) he was merely suggesting that since the Soviet Union was weaker than the West, it would be easy to topple their illusion of power and control. It is interesting to question whether or not the telegram itself (in terms of words) was so influential alone or if the United States leadership was just ripe for an all-out war on the principles of Communism and expansionism. Perhaps the telegram came out at a time when Truman and other leaders were beginning to greatly fear and detest Communism and the telegram offered them the well-timed support they needed. In any case, the telegram served Kennan’s goal of discussing Soviet ideals and the potential threat of expansion. Although it did not seem to predict the Cold War, it did help instigate the United States’ new reaction to Communism and the Soviet Union.
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Works Cited
Fakiolas, E. T. (1997). Kennan’s Long Telegram and NSC-68: A Comparative Theoretical Analysis.. East European Quarterly, 31(4), 415.
Kennan, George F. “The Long Telegram.” February 22, 1946.
Lukacs, John. (1995). From world war to cold war. American Heritage, 46(8), 42.
